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1Executive Summary
This report seeks to consider the economic impact of the Skye Bridge tolls
upon the local Skye economy. The general conclusion is that, although the
Bridge has been of benefit to Skye, the high level of the tolls has considerably
reduced its positive impact upon the local economy. The results of this report
rely primarily upon previous empirical research studies to provide information
on consumer and business travel and expenditure patterns. In addition 19
businesses and 9 policy actors were interviewed by telephone.
The report is broken down into six main sections:
• the introduction;
• previous research on the impact of the Bridge and toll charges;
• interviewees’ perspectives of the impact of the tolls;
• current costs of the tolls to the Skye economy;
• economic impacts of removal of the tolls;
• economic impacts of reducing the tolls;
• conclusions.
Previous research on the impact of the Bridge and toll charges
Several previous reports have considered the impacts of the Skye Bridge tolls.
They are briefly described and some of their data have been used in
compiling this report. 
Interviewees’ perspective of the impact of tolls
The bridge itself has widely been seen as a benefit for the local economy, for
example through reducing waiting and crossing times for traffic. However it
was felt by many that the size of the tolls meant that the full potential of the
bridge was not being realised. According to the small telephone survey of 19
business people the tolls largely have had a negative effect on visitors
numbers. The key points made are:
• Toll charges have considerably affected business for many, with in a
number of cases turnover having decreased despite the Bridge;
2• Among firms who reported no change in business, many still feel that
the tolls are damaging to business;
• Toll charges particularly discourage day-trippers who are important,
especially as they may be scouting for a longer break;
• A reduction in coach numbers has affected hotels and restaurants that
miss out on the lunch trade.
According to key policy actors and representative groups the tolls have:
• Had negative impacts, but with limited impact on tourist business; 
• Had a greater likely affect on short stay and UK visitors;
• An impact on the downturn in tourist coach traffic;
• Significantly increased costs to businesses importing and exporting
low-value high-volume goods;
• A deterrent effect only to marginal location and start-up decisions, as
availability of workforce, property and the quality of the environment
remain major location determinants;
• A limited impact on residents’ ability to access jobs and services;
• Led to a significant increase in costs for businesses in the Western
Isles, particularly exporters in the Uists;
• Had little impact upon tourism to the Western Isles.
The benefits of removing the tolls were seen to be:
• an increase in visitor numbers, particularly short stay visitors and
coach parties, with corresponding increases in tourist-related
employment;
• increased competitiveness for manufacturing and export business.
However some negative impacts of removing the tolls were claimed:
• removing tolls may convert longer-stay tourists to day trippers;
• increases in tourist employment in Skye may displace employment
from adjacent areas, e.g. Wester Ross;
• businesses dependent on traffic to and from the Glenelg to Kylerhea
and Mallaig to Armadale ferries would lose customers;
• traffic stopping at the bridge to pay tolls is used by a local business to
distribute tourist information leaflets – this facility would be lost;
• those employed in toll collection (around 6 – 8 people) would lose
their jobs;
• crime may increase on Skye if the physical barrier was removed.
3However, all the key actors consulted believed that in balance removing the
tolls would be beneficial to the local economy.
Current costs of the tolls
The results of the desk-based analysis are:
Due to money not being spent on tolls tourists would save £1,501,294, with
an additional income of £90,045 going into the Skye economy, and creation of
7.7 FTE jobs from tourism;
Saved tolls for local residents would be £498,244 which could potentially
generate around £597,893 additional income and 12.8 FTE jobs;
Saved tolls for local businesses would be £394,665, which after leakages and
multiplier effects would contribute £426,238 to the Skye economy and
generate around 9.1 FTE jobs;
Saved tolls for external businesses would be £1,316,373, of which after
leakages perhaps £855,642 is passed on to the Skye economy which could
potentially generate around £1,026,771 extra income and 22 FTE jobs;
In total the additional income accruing to the local economy from spending by
all the groups listed is estimated to be over £2.1m with employment
generation of 52 FTE jobs.
4Table E1 (in main text – Table 4.9): Estimated Income and
Employment From Diverted Toll Spending
Source Estimated tolls
paid
Additional Income
(including multiplier
effects)
Employment
(FTE)
Tourist expenditure £1,501,294 £90,045 7.7
Local resident
Expenditure
£498,244 £597,893 12.8
Local business
expenditure
£394,665 £426,238 9.1
External business
expenditure
£1,316,373 £1,026,771 22.0
Total toll expenditure £3,710,576 £2,140,947 51.6
Additional Economic impacts of removing the tolls
The anticipated increase in visitor numbers is around 10% if tolls were
removed. Expenditure may hence increase by 10% resulting in an additional
42,769 trips and £6,570,000 expenditure. This would result in an additional
£2.037m of income and an additional 169 FTE jobs.
Removing of the tolls could result in a number of additional changes in the
local economy as a result of more favourable trading conditions:
• new indigenous businesses may be set up;
• there may be an increase in inward investment;
• existing businesses may expand output and employment.
These changes would result in an additional £490,000 of income and an
additional 35 FTE jobs. When combined with the tourism growth removing the
tolls could lead to an extra £2.5m in income and 204 FTE jobs.
The total effects of removing the tolls would be this increase in income plus
the savings to existing users, giving an estimate of a total of £4.67m
additional income and 256 additional FTE jobs.
5Table E3 (5.4): Total Additional Income and Expenditure from Toll
Removal
Income Employment (FTE)
Diverted existing expenditure £2,140,947 51.6
Additional Growth £2,526,700 204
Total £4,667,647 255.6
Economic impacts of reducing the tolls 
a) Estimate of the impact of reducing the tolls: Scenario A - £1 Toll
each way for car traffic
The calculations indicate that the income and employment gains of a
reduction in toll charges to £1 each way for cars, and reduced charges for
other vehicles, are likely to be considerable, although clearly less than for the
removal of tolls.
The increase in tourist trips is estimated to be 34,643, resulting in extra
tourist spending of £5,321,791, leading to an additional £1,649,755 of local
income and 136.8 FTE jobs. In addition, tourists coming to Skye anyway
would get a total potential saving of £1,226,097 from paying lower tolls,
leading to an extra £245,219 being spent in the local economy, generating
£76,018 in additional income and an extra 6.3 FTE jobs. 
Local businesses would save a total of £299,139, giving an estimated
£323,070 additional income entering the local economy and generating 6.9
FTE jobs. External (non-Skye) businesses would save a total of £1,041,063,
giving an estimated £812,029 additional income entering the local economy
and generating 17.4 FTE jobs.
Local residents would save a total of £249,276 giving an estimated £301,288
additional income entering the local economy and generating 6.5 FTE jobs.
There would be approximately 3 additional business start-ups, generating
around 9 FTE jobs and providing £126,000 additional income. Increased
6business efficiency would generate around 18 additional jobs and provide
additional income of £252,000 to the local economy.
The estimated total impact of the Scenario A toll reduction is an additional
£3.54m income and 201 FTE jobs.
b) Estimate of the impact of reducing the tolls: Scenario B – Parity
With Forth Road Bridge Tolls
Our calculations show that the income and employment gains of a reduction
in toll charges to match the current Forth Road Bridge tolls (which are even
higher than those on the Erskine bridge), are estimated to be greater than in
Scenario A.
The increase in tourist trips could be 39,347 resulting in extra tourist spending
of £6,044,486, resulting in an additional £1,873,791 of income and 155.4 FTE
jobs. In addition, tourists already coming to Skye anyway would get a total
potential saving of £1,391,201 in tolls, leading to an extra £278,240 being
spent in the local economy, generating £86,254 in additional income and an
extra 7.2 FTE jobs. 
Local businesses would save a total of £356,454, giving an estimated
£384,971 additional income entering the local economy and generating 8.2
FTE jobs. External businesses would save a total of £1,206,249, giving an
estimated £855,642 additional income entering the local economy and
generating 20.2 FTE jobs.
Local residents would save a total of £398,656 giving an estimated £478,387
additional income entering the local economy and generating 10.3 FTE jobs.
There would be approximately 4 additional business start-ups, generating
around 12 FTE jobs and providing £168,000 additional income. Increased
business efficiency would generate around 21 additional FTE jobs and provide
additional income of £294,000 to the local economy.
The total estimated impact of the Scenario B toll reduction to be an additional
£4.14m income and 234 FTE jobs in the local economy.
7Table E3 (6.10): Summary of Estimated Income and Employment
Gains from Reduced Toll Charges
Scenario A Scenario BSource
Income Employment Income Employment
Tourism (existing and
additional)
£1,725,773 143.1 £1,960,045 162.6
Local residents £301,288 6.5 £478,387 10.3
Local business £323,070 6.9 £384,971 8.2
External business £812,029 17.4 £855,642 20.2
Additional business start-
ups
£126,000 9.0 £168,000 12.0
Extra business efficiency £252,000 18.0 £294,000 21.0
Total £3,540,160 200.9 £4,141,045 234.3
Conclusions
The general conclusions are:
1. Although the Bridge has been of benefit to Skye, the high levels of
the toll have considerably reduced its potential positive impact upon
the local economy.
2. There is considerable local resentment to the tolls, with businesses
reporting that tourists, particularly short stay visitors and coach
parties, have been deterred from crossing the bridge.
3. There would be likely gains from removing or reducing the tolls in
terms of diverting existing toll spending, increased tourism,
increased business efficiency and more business start-ups.
4. The economic benefits from removing the tolls would be
substantial, with around £4.67m of additional income entering the
local economy and the creation of perhaps 250 FTE jobs (around
6% of current Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise area employment).
5. There would also be noticeable benefits from reducing the toll
charges, with one scenario (based upon a car toll of £1 each way)
offering around 76% of the potential income and 78% of the
potential employment benefits, and the other scenario (based upon
Forth Road Bridge tolls levels) resulting in 89% of the income and
91% of the employment benefits of complete toll removal.
11. Introduction
1.1 Outline of the Report
This report seeks to consider the economic impact upon the local Skye
economy of the tolls on the Skye Bridge. It is primarily desk-based and relies
on the results of previous accepted empirical research to provide information
on consumer and business travel and expenditure patterns. In addition 19
businesses and 10 policy actors were interviewed by telephone. In line with
the brief, the main aims of the study are as follows.
• To estimate the cost of the tolls to the Skye economy.
• To estimate the amount of money that would directly enter the local
economy as a result of removing the tolls.
• To quantify the extra economic growth that would be generated from
removing the tolls.
• To estimate the economic impact of tax revenues and toll reduction
subsidies.
• To assess the effect that the tolls have on inward investment.
• To produce a rough estimate of the economic impact of the tolls on
other local economies connected to Skye and Lochalsh, principally the
Western Isles.
We have taken these criteria to produce an up-to-date report rooted in
analysis that will present economic evidence to inform decision makers. In
addition the findings of the study provide an enhanced understanding of the
role of bridge tolls on local economic development in general and an up to
date census on the economic well-being of the local area and the attitudes
and perceptions of local businesses. The report is broken down into six main
sections:
• this introduction;
• previous research on the impact of the Bridge and toll charges;
• interviewees’ perspectives of the impact of the tolls;
• the costs of the current of tolls;
• the economic impacts of removal of the tolls;
• the economic impacts of reducing the tolls;
• conclusions.
21.2 Skye Bridge Traffic
The baseline figures for these calculations are the Bridge crossings in the
latest year available, namely 2001. Scottish Executive figures show that in
total, the Skye Bridge had 666,000 vehicle crossings in 2001 (around 1,825
per day), by far the largest component is private cars, with almost 600,000
vehicles (90% of the total) (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Skye Bridge Traffic Figures by Vehicle Type, 2001
Vehicle Traffic
Motorcycle 12,684
Cars 598,264
LGV 10,205
HGV 1 15,423
HGV 2 14,551
Service Bus 4,006
Midi Coach 1,721
Coach 4,347
Car & Caravan 4,921
LGV & Trailer 199
Total 666,321
Source: Scottish Executive (2002)
The total for 2001 was about 1% less than the 675,000 figure for 2000. Table
1.2 shows that between 1995 when the Bridge opened and 2001:
• the number of vehicles making the crossing rose steadily year on year
from 612,000 in 1996 to 675,000 in 2000, before falling back in 2001;
• the number of vehicles in all categories except buses was higher in
2001 that it was in 1996;
• the proportion of cars has remained fairly static at around 92% of
total traffic;
• the total annual toll levied rose from 1996 to 1999 and was static at
around £3.8m in 2000.
Traffic flows across the Skye Bridge have seen a sustained increase since
opening in October 1995 of around 8%. The increase in major traffic flows
across Scotland was around 3% over the same period, and there was a fall of
39% in the Highland area. This indicates that traffic across the Bridge is
growing disproportionately quickly. We can say with confidence that demand
increased despite the tolls, however, these figures do not provide us with an
estimate of the growth that would have occurred without toll charges.
Table 1.2 Skye Bridge Crossings, Thousands, 1996-2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Private Cars and
LGVs
563 575 601 613 618 613
HGVs 26 29 33 29 34 30
Buses 12 12 12 11 11 10
Motorcycles 10 11 10 11 12 13
Exempted
vehicles
1 - - - - -
Total traffic 612 627 656 665 675 666
Tolls levied (at
2000 prices) £K
3,544 3,518 3,743 3,775 3,775 n/a
Source: Scottish Executive (2002)
The toll revenue figures are useful, as they give a rough indication of the
money spent by tourists, local residents and businesses that might otherwise
largely be spent in the local economy. Approximately £3.8m of potential
spending was paid into toll charges in 2000. 
1.3 Economic impacts
The main economic impacts are in terms of the effects of tolls on: spending
power and efficiency; the level of suppressed journeys (people choosing not
to travel to or from Skye due to the tolls); and inward investment. 
The toll figures do not take into account the fact that not all the money spent
on tolls would end up in the local economy, and that the money that would be
spent locally would be subject to multiplier effects due to indirect and induced
spending. Also only a proportion of the money spent by tourists on toll
charges would enter the local economy if tolls were abolished – some may be
spent in other parts of Scotland and some saved. As the proportion of
potential toll money that would be spent in Skye is likely to differ between
4tourist, residents or businesses it is therefore necessary to estimate the
amount spent on tolls by each group. 
Section 2 considers other research and section 3 considers the views of
interviewees. The effects of the tolls are considered in section 4. Suppressed
journeys and inward investment are considered in section 5. The effects of
reducing (rather than removing) the tolls are considered in section 6. 
52. A Synthesis of Previous Research
2.1 Introduction
This section gathers together the key findings from research specifically
relating to the Skye Bridge, although some other studies will be mentioned
where relevant. It considers the general economic impact of the Bridge and
the specific impact of tolls.
2.2 The Economic Impact of the Skye Bridge
The bridge has widely been seen as a benefit for the local economy, for
example through reducing waiting and crossing times for traffic. However, it
was felt by many that the size of the tolls meant that the full economic
development potential of the bridge was not being realised. 
i) Ex-ante study
Taking an ex ante perspective, the anticipated economic benefits of the Skye
Bridge crossing on the local economy were discussed in a study by Pieda
(Pieda, 1991). The main points highlighted were:
• an increase in tourist traffic to Skye resulting from reduced
congestion;
• greater business efficiency from time savings at the crossing;
• an increase in passing trade business in Kyle from approach road
traffic;
• extra development land created by building work adjacent to new the
slip roads.
The development of adjacent land has been identified in impact studies of
bridges within the UK (e.g. the Humber Bridge) and outside the UK. For
example, the decision to complete a second Peace Bridge between Canada
and the US triggered a $20m international trade complex in an adjacent
industrial park, although this was linked to improving international trade
(American City Business Journals Inc., 1998). 
In addition, the study also pointed to possible negative economic effects:
• job losses resulting from the closure of the ferry (although this is a
‘one-off’ effect);
6• greater difficulty for foot passengers commuting between Kyleakin and
Kyle;
• a decrease in business from passing trade in Kyleakin, as the approach
road bypasses this town. 
The baseline study by Transport Research Laboratories and Derek Halden
(TRL, 1995) examines the likely socio-economic impact of the bridge from a
transport perspective. It concluded that there were likely to be changes to the
physical infrastructure of Skye, with resulting impacts on accessibility, and
examined the costs and benefits of this, and the distribution of these costs
and benefits. The study makes the following conclusions:
• The 30-year net present value benefit from the bridge at 1994 prices
is £30.7m;
• The bulk of the benefits from the bridge will come from timesavings.
• The reduced tolls for some vehicles, particularly light vans, also result
in some operating cost savings;
• Cars users are the main beneficiaries and pedestrians are the main
losers;
• If the ferries operate reliably for about 95% of the time, the effect is a
near doubling of the benefits from the bridge;
• Re-routing of traffic will be much more significant for the competing
ferry crossings than for the bridge. 
ii) Ex-post studies
The ex post follow-up report by DTZ Pieda for the Scottish Executive into the
socio-economic impact of the Skye Bridge after completion (Scottish
Executive, 1999) found that although the Bridge had led to increased traffic
growth, the social and economic impacts were limited – although this varied
by sector. The impact on the tourism industry was found to be neutral in
terms of occupancy rates and number of overnight stays, and made little
difference to visitor attitudes towards the attractiveness of Skye as a place to
visit. 
However, criticism has been levied by Skye and Kyle Against Tolls (SKAT) at
the methodology used, particularly concerning the measurement of
suppressed journeys. They argued:
“How can you measure the amount of people who don’t turn up? The tourists
that were interviewed were here because the tolls had not affected their
7decision. What about those who will not come here because of the
extortionate prices?” (SKAT, 2000 web).
Notwithstanding this criticism, it is possible that the extra convenience
afforded by the Bridge is offset by the toll charges. A separate study by
Independent Northern Consultants (INC, 1996) shortly after the Bridge
opened found that visits to tourist information centres had increased in the
first year of opening by 27% in Kyle and 52% in Portree, although this was
partially explained by an increase in visitors to the Highlands in general in
1996. It was also pointed out that there may have been a novelty attraction
of the Bridge in the first year.
The Bridge did not appear to alter business traffic patterns in the area,
although ‘exporting’ businesses (those selling outwith Skye) reported that the
Bridge had a negative effect on their transport movements, probably due to
the tolls. Some sectors fared better than others, with construction businesses
reporting a positive impact, but retail and restaurant businesses reporting a
negative impact. However, the overall impact of the Bridge on local
businesses was felt to be very slight when compared with wider economic
factors.
The effects of the Bridge on population and property prices in Skye were
inconclusive – there was an increase in population and prices but this could
be due to other factors. The Bridge did have some direct effect, with 6% of
local Skye residents indicating that they had moved to Skye from elsewhere
because of the Bridge (from opening to July 1998), although corresponding
out-migration figures are not available. 
The Bridge did appear to result in an increase in traffic growth, with traffic
across the Bridge increasing significantly faster than in the rest of Highland
Region. Interestingly there has been a fall in the number (and hence a
sharper fall in the percentage) of Bridge traffic travelling to the Western Isles.
As pointed out by Ross, Skye and Inverness MP Charles Kennedy, increased
traffic does not automatically imply increased economic benefits:
"(The Minister’s) glib response boils down to equating more journeys with the
Bridge being a success. This kind of shallow analysis shows that she has no
understanding of the difficulties the tolls are causing on Skye" (SKAT, 2000
web).
8There have been two developments on land adjacent to the Bridge, both on
the Kyle of Lochalsh side. One is a major extension of a leisure centre and the
other is a National Trust for Scotland visitor centre. It was not possible to
determine how many potential employees and users living on Skye were
deterred due to the tolls. 
A follow-up study to TRL (1995) was undertaken by TRL and Derek Halden
(TRL, 1996) examined the impacts on the economy in the year following the
opening of the bridge. The study undertook a series of travel and traffic
surveys and came to the following conclusions:
• Substantial growth on the Kyle of Lochalsh crossing to Skye
particularly for longer distance trips had taken place. This was not
necessarily due to the bridge, but the traffic growth is beyond what the
ferry could have accommodated;
• The bridge had had an effect on travel patterns, with more voluntary
trips, such as leisure activities, but less effect on more routine travel
requirements such as travel to work;
• The bridge had brought travel time and reliability benefits, however,
because of increased usage and dependence, the tolls were a greater
burden, although they were priced equally to the ferry;
• Those who viewed the bridge as a positive asset continued to do so,
but fewer people now considered that the bridge will have or was
having a negative effect on the area;
• There had been a substantial increase in tourist bus and coach travel.
The economic impacts of this is dependent on changes in tourist
spend, particularly overnight stays, and whether local tourist
infrastructure responds to this;
• There were some early indications that an increased proportion of
trips appeared to be travelling through Skye to the Western Isles.
There were also more circular trips to Skye with a ferry crossing on one
leg of the journey.
The authors stated that the last point should be treated with caution as trip
patterns could change in the long run.
It seems reasonable to say, therefore, that although there appear to have
been positive economic impacts of the Bridge, these may not have been as
9great as were originally anticipated in all areas. From the main studies the
overall impact on tourism, business and demographics appears to be
somewhat limited. This raises the question as to what extent are these limited
impacts due to the existence of the relatively high toll charges levied and
would a reduction (perhaps to zero) in tolls result in significantly greater
economic impacts. The studies below have attempted to address this issue.
 
2.3 The Impact of Toll Charges
There have been a number of studies undertaken to isolate the specific effect
of toll charges on the Skye Bridge. The INC (INC, 1996) study found that over
£850,000 had been paid by Skye residents and businesses towards Bridge
tolls in the first year of operation. 
• With multiplier effects, tourism spending and increased prices from
suppliers paying tolls being taken into account the toll costs (and hence
the benefit of removal) this represented over £1.3m pa lost to Skye
alone, and almost £1.5m pa in the wider Skye and Lochalsh area. At
1996 local wages this would equate to 99 Full Time Equivalent (FTE)
jobs in the local economy. 
• The study also estimated that removing tolls would increase tourist
visitors to Skye by at least 10%, which would provide 96 FTE jobs
worth £992,000 pa including multiplier effects. 
• The direct effects on export business competitiveness were estimated
to be more modest due to the low number of these businesses on the
island. After multiplier effects, increased export efficiency was
estimated to generate 12 FTE jobs worth £184,000 pa to the local
economy. 
• In total, INC (1996) estimated that the total annual income benefit of
removing the Bridge tolls would generate over £2.5m, or 208 FTE jobs.
A separate study on the impact of the toll charges on Tourism (System Three,
1996) interviewed a sample of tourists visiting the Highlands and found:
• 15% of tourists who had decided not to go to Skye, or who were
considering not going, cited the toll charges being too expensive as the
main reason.  
• Almost one quarter of all visitors questioned were unaware of the
existence of a toll – these were mainly overseas visitors – and almost
10
half of visitors did not know the cost. Only 9% of continental European
visitors knew the toll cost.
• 11% of visitors who had been to Skye stated that they definitely would
not have visited Skye had they known the toll charge in advance, and a
further 18% stated that they would have thought twice about their
visit.
• For respondents intending to visit Skye, the corresponding figures were
6%, who would definitely not visit and 8% who would probably not.
• 23% of visitors who stated that they would definitely not visit Skye said
the toll charge was a major influence, and 16% said it was a minor
influence.
These figures indicate that toll charges have a relatively small but notable
deterrent effect on repeat and potential visits to Skye. 
The Scottish Executive (1999) study for the Scottish Executive examined the
economic impact of the Bridge itself, and while this study was not intended to
quantify the impact of removing tolls, it produced some interesting findings
including:
• tourist and other traffic over the Bridge had grown year on year,
despite the tolls (although it may have grown faster without them);
• businesses exporting goods from Skye reported that the Bridge had
had a negative impact on transport, possibly due to the toll charges.
• there was widespread resentment of the tolls among business in
general;
• the revised discount structure introduced in 1998 had led to an
increase in use of the Bridge;
• there was no evidence to suggest that traffic to the Western Isles had
re-routed across the Bridge (again, possibly because of the tolls).
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3. Perspectives on the Toll Charges
3.1 Introduction
This report is primarily a desk-based study, and as such draws primarily on
secondary data collected from a variety of sources. However, findings based
on statistical information and previous studies may not reflect the current
experience of key actors in the local economy. For this reason the views were
sought, through a telephone survey, of a number of local businesses and
policy professionals who have an interest in the Skye economy. This section
reports the findings from these interviews. 
3.2 Local Businesses
A total of 19 businesses were consulted, covering manufacturing, tourism and
agriculture/fishing, regarding a range of issues including:
• the effects of the Bridge tolls on their business;
• the effects of the tolls on visitors and tourist business on Skye in
general;
• the effect on visitor expenditure of people who do visit;
• whether tolls increase operating costs – and to what extent;
• the likely impact of removing the tolls.
Table 3.1 below gives a profile of our business sample.
Table 3.1: Local Business Sample Characteristics
Characteristic Number
Sector:   Manufacturing 7 (37%)
             Agriculture, Fishing 3 (16%)
             Other services 9 (47%)
Tourism dependent 15 (79%)
Average number of employees:  full time 15
                                               part time 5
12
The Effect of Tolls on Visitors Numbers to Tourist Businesses
Businesses were asked whether they believed the tolls affected their business.
The key points made are given below:
• toll charges have considerably affected business for many, with in
some cases turnover having decreased despite the Bridge;
• among business who reported no change in business, many still feel
that the tolls are damaging to business;
• toll charges particularly discourage day-trippers who are important to
business, especially as they may be scouting for a longer break;
• a reduction in coach numbers has affected hotels and restaurants that
miss out on the lunch trade.
Businesses were able to provide substantial evidence for the above points:
• some coach operators have pulled out of touring Skye resulting in a
loss of business. One business reported that 53 coaches had already
been cancelled in the period January to May 2002, although it is
unclear how much of this was due to the tolls;
• Web site feedback indicated that people have cancelled visits because
of the tolls;
• discussion with visitors has revealed that people are annoyed with the
level of toll charges and are reducing the number of trips they make;
• discussions with visitors reveal that it is the perception of bad value
relative to the ferry and other bridges that discourages people to come
to Skye;
• conversation with visitors reveal that some choose to stay on the
mainland instead of making the journey to Skye. However, some of
these say they do stay in Kyle.
In addition to the direct effect on tourism businesses, the toll charges had a
knock-on impact on other businesses:
• the effect of tolls on non-tourist industries is felt indirectly, as many
local businesses are suppliers to the hotel and catering trade;
• removal of tolls would increase visitor numbers resulting in a multiplier
effect with increased demand for supplies and building and
maintenance work in the hotel sector.
However, not all businesses were critical of the tolls. Points made were that:
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• toll charges have to be put in perspective – other problems such as
September 11, Foot and Mouth and the high value of Sterling are
equally important;
• some businesses on Sleat have seen an increase in business, as the
Bridge tolls encourage more visitors to use the Mallaig to Armadale
ferry.
Despite this, the majority of business interviewed felt that the tolls reduced
visitor numbers and were bad for business. One firm summed up the feeling
of many:
“Tolls affect our business very much. Our visitor numbers have been down
over the last 5 years and every customer who comes complains about the
cost of the tolls. They come home and tell their friends about that.”
The Effect of Tolls on Visitor Numbers in General
We also asked businesses whether they thought the toll charges had an effect
on visitor numbers to the Skye as a whole. The key points made are given
below:
• potential visitors do turn back at the tolls. One business estimated this
at between 5 and 10%;
• short-stay tourists are more likely to be deterred;
• tourists are more likely to turn back in poor weather and later in the
day;
• fewer visitors arrive ‘on-spec’ than previously. The trade is becoming
reliant on pre-booking;
• many coach tour operators have pulled out. The budget end of the
coach market is hit harder, as the tolls are proportionately higher cost
for these operators;
• the Portree area appears to have been most affected.
Evidence for effects on other businesses was not hard to come by for most
people we interviewed. Skye is a dispersed, but relatively tight-knit
community and there is considerable informal networking among local
businesses. Methods providing the evidence included:
• conversations with other businesses, especially hotels and B&Bs;
• conversations with tour bus/coach operators who no longer come to
the island and report tolls as the main reason;
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• conversations with people who have worked on the tolls reveal that
cars do turn back;
• personal sightings of cars turning back;
• reports in the local press.
In summary therefore, these is some evidence from local businesses of a
widespread decrease in visitor numbers resulting from the toll charges. One
quote which summarised the widespread effect:
“I have seen cars pull up the to toll booth and then turned away from it.
When travelling around the country and you mention you’re from Skye,
people say ‘The island with the expensive Bridge?’ ”.
The Effect of Tolls on Visitor Expenditure
Businesses were also asked whether, and to what extent, the tolls affected
the spending of the tourists who did decide to visit Skye. Evidence on this was
mixed, with some businesses reporting more effects than others. The key
points arising regarding reduction of spending were:
• there is a bigger effect on visitors taking shorter trips – this may effect
spending on the mainland if Skye is part of a larger trip;
• the psychological effect of the tolls – visitors feel ‘ripped off’ and
therefore feel less inclined to spend – one business described this as
the ‘grump factor’;
• visitors on a tight budget, particularly those with families, do reduce
their spending;
• first impressions count – the tolls give visitors a bad initial view of
Skye which may curtail their spending.
However, counter to the above, several businesses commented that the
monetary value of the tolls charges were small compared with an overall
holiday budget, therefore the impact of the tolls is small. One also mentioned
that some visitors may be more sympathetic to the problems faced by Skye
businesses as a result of the poll and will try not to reduce their spending.
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The Effect of Tolls on Non-Tourist Business Income
In addition to the above, we interviewed a number of businesses who stated
that tourism was not important to them, either directly or indirectly. They
were asked about the effect of the tolls on their income. Specific comments
included the following.
• the tolls do not have a big impact as most business is done through
mail order;
• all business is external to Skye, therefore tolls have no effect on
income.
From the above it would appear that the toll charges have limited effect on
the income of businesses that are not dependent on tourism. In the case of
our sample, this is because the businesses were largely reliant on exporting
goods and services. However, the next section shows that this was not the
case when operating costs were considered.
Operating Costs
All businesses, whether tourist dependent or not, were asked whether the
tolls increased their operating costs. 15 (79%) of businesses replied that the
tolls did impact on their operating costs to an extent. There was a variation in
the amount by which different businesses felt their operating costs were
increased by due to the tolls. Specific comments are given below:
• couriers and suppliers pass on most or all of the toll costs to local
businesses – sometimes the surcharge for Skye delivery of supplies can
wipe out any profit margin;
• firms exporting and importing heavy and bulky goods were the worst
affected;
• business visitors to Skye firms pass their costs on and business visits
by Skye personnel to the mainland are also a cost;
• businesses with a mobile sales force travelling outside Skye incur
considerable costs;
• local businesses are limited in the amount of costs they can pass on to
customers, otherwise they would lose market share;
• the fact that many Skye businesses are very dependent on both
suppliers and markets outside Skye intensifies the cost problem.
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Of those reporting that the tolls had no impact on their operating costs, the
following points were made:
• mail order business by Royal Mail was unaffected;
• some large national (UK) or international suppliers absorb the cost of
the Bridge tolls and do not surcharge for Skye delivery;
• courier firms are unaffected;
• even though business costs are not affected, basic consumables such
as bread are more expensive which raises costs for all residents and
businesses.
It is also worth noting that some businesses had supplies delivered to Kyle
and picked them up personally to get round any surcharge imposed by a
supplier or courier. This would be particularly worthwhile where the local
business had discount tickets, as most do.
3.3 Key Policy Actors
We interviewed a number of  key policy actors to obtain their views on the
effects of the toll charges and the potential benefits of removal of these.
Specifically, we asked about the effects of the tolls on:
• tourism;
• local and external businesses efficiency;
• inward investment and business start-ups;
• the ability of residents to access employment and other facilities;
• the economy of the Western Isles.
The Effects of the Tolls on Tourism
Consultees were asked what, if any, effect the toll charges had on visitor
numbers and expenditure. The main points are given below:
• It is the level of charge together with tourist perception that road
travel should be free that can deter visitors;
• Coach operators are deterred by the tolls – many businesses have
seen a downturn of coach party trade;
• Day trippers and speculative visitors are more likely to turn back at the
tolls;
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• UK day and weekend trippers who do cross are also more likely to
spend less once in Skye, as the toll makes up a greater percentage of
their total cost;
• Adverse publicity means some potential visitors are under the
impression that the tolls are even higher than the current level.
However, some consultees pointed out that the effect of the tolls were limited
and may even encourage some visitors:
• The deterrent effect is greater upon UK visitors. Overseas visitors are
likely to have already made the decision to come to Skye;
• Overseas visitors are less likely to have encountered negative publicity
regarding the tolls;
• Visitors tend to be in a more relaxed frame of mind on holiday and
therefore more willing to spend;
• Travel costs in the highlands are high anyway and tourists are
accustomed to this;
• The romantic notion of travelling ‘over the sea to Skye’ usually
overcomes any resentment to the toll;
• The toll may increase the perceived exclusivity of Skye as a location;
• The bridge, tolls and associated publicity can be a talking point for
visitors!;
• The spending of overseas visitors that do come to Skye is not greatly
affected by the tolls, as the tolls are a small proportion of overall
expenditure and they are more accustomed to paying tolls;
• There is a spin off benefit to the rest of the Highlands economy, as
visitors turning back at the bridge are likely to spend more time on the
mainland.
It is fair to say that the majority of actors interviewed held the belief that the
tolls had a negative impact on tourist business, although this was often minor,
and more likely to affect short stay and UK visitors.
The Effects of Tolls on Local Businesses
While most consultees were of the opinion that the bridge itself had been a
benefit to Skye, many had concerns regarding the impact of the tolls on
business efficiency and competitiveness. The main points are detailed below:
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• Local businesses face high costs of haulage and access to customers;
• Tolls restrict the supply of labour available to businesses on both sides
of the bridge;
• Businesses that were involved in haulage of bulky and heavy goods
were most affected;
• Haulage and courier businesses based outside Skye tended to over-
charge local firms for transport on and off the island;
• The costs of the tolls are eventually passed on to all businesses in the
form of increased costs – it is a form of VAT;
• Many Skye exporters are selling low value goods with a tight profit
margin. The tolls can wipe out this profit;
• There is a disincentive for firms to use rail freight transport as they
must pay the toll to get to the terminal in Kyle.
Again, there were some moderating factors mentioned:
• If the tolls were removed, businesses dependent on Mallaig to
Armadale ferry traffic would suffer;
• Distribution costs for businesses in the west highlands are high
everywhere because of the distance from the markets. The bridge tolls
are only a small component of these costs;
• The forestry industry had overcome the problem by using sea barges
to transport timber;
• Exporters selling high value goods such as shellfish are affected less,
as the tolls are small compared to the profit margin.
The Impact on Inward Investment and Start-ups
The following concerns were expressed about the effect of tolls on business
formation:
• Some potential investors will not consider Skye if they cannot find
suitable premises in Lochalsh. The tolls have been mentioned as a
factor in this;
• Inward investors dependent on exporting bulk goods can be deterred;
• Tourist-dependent start-ups have fallen in recent years, partly due to
toll effects on visitor numbers.
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However, most consultees expressed the opinion that the tolls will only make
a difference to marginal location and start-up decisions. The availability of
workforce and property and the quality of the environment remain the main
location determinants for businesses considering Skye. The tolls may even
have had a positive effect by encouraging the development of better retail
facilities on Skye.
Residents’ Access to Facilities and Employment
We asked consultees whether the tolls were a significant barrier to residents
accessing employment and other facilities such as shopping, leisure,
education and health care. This could be a potential problem for people living
in Skye accessing facilities in Kyle, particularly residents in the south of the
island for whom Portree is less accessible. It may also be a potential problem
for Kyle residents accessing jobs and facilities on Skye. Consultees expressed
the following concerns:
• There is a problem for people on Skye accessing higher order services
on the mainland, e.g. care services for children with medical
conditions. This could lead to a population drain off the island;
• Replacing the discount tickets with a prepaid swipe card would make
travel more convenient.
However, in the main, the impact of the tolls on residents accessing services
was thought to be minor. The following points were highlighted:
• Discount tickets make regular travel more affordable; 
• Residents who only make the trip occasionally are less likely to have
discount tickets, but the occasional trip is not a big cost;
• Skye residents are not deterred from visiting the leisure centre in Kyle,
similarly there is no sign that Kyle residents are deterred from shopping
on Skye.
• Public transport is cheap across the bridge as the operators and
Highland Council bear most of the cost;
• There is a shuttle bus operating between Kyle and Kyleakin for which
the single adult fare is 15p and free for those holding a Highland
Council Travel Card, children under 16 and unemployed people
showing a valid UB40 card (and soon to be free for those over 60).
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The Impact on the Western Isles Economy
Consultees were asked whether the bridge tolls had a knock-on effect on the
economy of the Western Isles. The Uig to Tarbert/Lochmaddy ferry service is
a vital link for the islands, particularly North Uist, to the mainland. The
following issues were raised:
• Businesses in North and South Uist are most affected as they are
dependent on the Uig to Lochmaddy ferry service;
• Almost all commercial traffic to and from Uist goes over the Skye
Bridge;
• Tolls are less of a concern to business in Lewis and Harris, most of
whom use the Ullapool to Stornoway service;
• Fish and shellfish farming businesses are most affected as they are
reliant upon exports and face stiff competition. Tolls could affect the
survival of these firms.
Although the effects on exporting businesses were felt to be considerable, the
impact on tourism was felt to be weaker. Most consultees felt that the tolls
are unlikely to deter tourists from visiting the Western Isles:
• Most tourist bookings on the Uig to Lochmaddy service are made
through central reservations. Tourists are probably unaware of the
bridge tolls when bookings are made;
• The cost of the tolls and the Uig ferry crossing is not significantly more
than other ferry crossings to the Western Isles;
• The growth in traffic on the Uig to Lochmaddy route is in line with that
of the Ullapool to Stornoway route.
Positive Impacts of Removing the Tolls
The potential benefits from removing the tolls were felt to be considerable.
One consultee summarised the general feeling with the statement:
 “The tolls are a tax on peripherality” 
The main points raised were as follows:
• removing tolls would result in an increase in the number of short stay
tourists, and of coach operators running tours to Skye, with
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subsequent increases in income and employment in tourist dependent
businesses;
• removing tolls would also lead to an increase in business efficiency
and employment among manufacturing and exporting businesses;
• it would be good PR for the island and may attract more visitors;
• the increase in visitor numbers would be high initially, then would
settle down to a new, relatively higher level;
• an increase in all types of traffic across the bridge would lead to
economic growth across all sectors in Skye. 
Negative Impacts on Removing Tolls
There were, however, several potential disadvantages associated with
removing the tolls. These included:
• the tolls may currently encourage visitors to stay longer on the island
– removing tolls may convert longer-stay tourists into day trippers;
• subsequent increases in tourist employment in Skye may displace
employment from adjacent areas, e.g. Wester Ross;
• businesses in the south of the island, dependent on traffic to and from
the Glenelg to Kylerhea and Mallaig to Armadale ferries, would lose
business;
• traffic stopping at the bridge to pay tolls is used by a local business to
distribute tourist information leaflets – this facility would be lost;
• those employed in toll collection (around 6 – 8 people) would lose
their jobs;
• crime may increase on Skye if the physical barrier was removed.
It is worth noting that the last three problems would be potentially solved if
the tolls were reduced to an acceptable level rather than removed altogether.
We have investigated the impacts of doing this further in section 6.
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4. Current costs of the tolls to the Skye Economy
4.1 Introduction
This section details the estimations of the impact of existing toll charges on
the local economy. Such a task is not straightforward and relies on a number
of assumptions, which are stated in the following sections. However, we
believe that the figures present a reliable estimate of the current impact of
the tolls. In order to assess this impact, we have looked at the following
areas.
• The impact on tourist spending
• The impact on indigenous business costs
• The impact on external business costs (and passed on to local
businesses and residents)
• The impact on local residents
4.2 Impact on Tourist Spending
To estimate the annual spend on tolls by tourists it is first necessary to
calculate the number of tourists crossing the Bridge in a given year. The study
commissioned by the Scottish Executive (1999) gave some indication of
tourist traffic, revealing:
• An estimated 141,492 (65% of cars) crossing the Bridge in July-
September 1995 were tourists; 
• In the same period in 1998 tourist usage had risen to 168,610 (72%
of cars) – an absolute growth of 19%, or relative growth of 7% points
over 3 years;
• 38% in summer (April to September) used a discount ticket, compared
with 66% of cars in winter 1998 (October 1997 to March 1998).
Assuming that discount tickets are used predominantly by non-tourists1
this implies that around 62% of cars in summer and 33% in winter will
include occasional business visitors, local residents using the Bridge
                                                          
1 The System Three tourist survey (System Three, 1996) found that only 2% of visitors used
the discount vouchers.
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occasionally, as well as tourists (including those visiting friends and
families);
• A roadside survey in August 1998 revealed that over 78% of cars
crossing the Bridge reported ‘holidays’ as their main purpose.
To more accurately estimate annual tourist traffic the seasonal figures for
Bridge crossings were examined. Table 4.1 below gives the monthly total car
and caravan flows for the Skye Bridge (assuming that none or a negligible
amount of the Mallaig-Armadale ferry traffic goes to the Uig ferry). There is a
proportion of car, coach and motorcycle traffic that will be passing through
Skye en route to the Western Isles via the ferry at Uig. Money spent on toll
charges by these people would primarily enter the economy of the Western
Isles rather than Skye. This is shown in the Table as ‘through traffic’. It is
assumed that the tolls are tiny compared to the total cost of taking a car to
the Western Isles and so overall have limited effects on their choice of routes,
and that there is negligible travel to the Western Isles by Skye residents.
Table 4.1: Monthly Total Car Traffic Flows for Skye Bridge, 2001
Month Cars and caravans Through traffic Net of through
traffic
Jan 27,338 1,341 25,997
 Feb 27,029 1,216 25,813
 Mar 35,008 1,712 33,296
 Apr 47,686 3,005 44,681
 May 58,718 3,693 55,025
 Jun 62,094 4,587 57,507
 Jul 76,302 6,635 69,667
 Aug 88,616 6,586 82,030
 Sep 62,556 4,127 58,429
 Oct 48,966 3,495 45,471
 Nov 35,776 1,641 34,135
 Dec 33,096 1,808 31,288
Total 603,185 39,846 563,339
Source: Scottish Executive (2001)
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This table shows:
• the total annual car and caravan flow is 603,185;
• a distinct seasonal variation in such traffic, with a peak traffic flow of
88,616 in August and an annual low of 27,029 in February;
• the difference between the peak (August) and lowest (February) is
61,587;
• the traffic flow, net of through traffic, shows a similar pattern with an
August peak of 82,030 and a February low of 25,813 – a difference of
56,217;
• the total through traffic to the Western Isles for 2001 is 39,846 or 7%
of the total Bridge crossings, varying from nearly 9% in July to 4% in
February. The through traffic also shows a similar seasonal variation to
the total traffic, with a peak in July of 6,635 and a low in January of
1,216.
Toll expenditure has been calculated at April 2001 toll charges of £5.70 each
way high season (May – September inclusive) and £4.70 low season (October
– April). Table 4.2 outlines the charges.
Table 4.2: Toll Pricing Structure for Local Resident Traffic
Cars M/cycles Buses Large
coaches
Midi
coaches
High season
(May-Sept.)
£5.70 £2.90 £16.40 £41.20 £23.70
Low season
(Oct.-March)
£4.70 £2.40 £16.40 £27.90 £15.80
Average (used in
Tables 4.6-8) 
£5.20 £2.65 £16.40 £34.55 £19.75
Discount rate £1.34 £0.67 £12.26 N/A N/A
Source: Skye Bridge Ltd.
The average toll charges for the year have been taken as £5.20, midway
between low and high season, and are used to calculate local resident toll
expenditure later (if the average toll is weighted by car use for each month
then the average toll would be £5.28). Approximately 1% of the car and
caravan traffic above will be cars with caravans, who will be charged double
the car rate at £11.40 high season and £9.40 low season. We therefore add
an additional 1% to the overall car tolls for tourists to cover this.
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To estimate the effect of the tolls on tourists to the Skye economy, the
figures net of through traffic have been used. The method of estimating the
number of tourist and local traveller cars using the Bridge is shown in
appendix 2. It indicates that the majority of the increase in traffic between
summer and winter is made up of tourist traffic, as local residents and
business traffic will cross the Bridge all year round (with a limited increase in
the summer). Table 4.3 provides estimates for the car and caravan tourist
traffic and toll expenditure.
Table 4.3: Estimated Monthly Tourist Car and Caravan Traffic and
Toll Outlay, Skye Bridge, 2001
Season Cars and
caravans*
Number of
Tourist Cars
Number of
‘local’ cars
% Tourist
cars
Total Tourist
Toll
Expenditure 
Summer (April-
Sept.)
61,223 35,889 25,334 58.6% £1,058,438
Winter    (Oct. –
Mar.)
32,666 8,636 24,031 26.4% £245,970
TOTAL 563,339 267,150 296,190 47.4% £1,304,408
*Net of through traffic   Numbers are rounded.
This table shows:
• the total estimated tourist traffic crossing the Bridge and staying in
Skye for 2001 is around 267,000;
• total tourist traffic varies between around 8,636 in the winter months
(March-October) to 35,889 in summer (April-September) – a difference
of 27,253;
• tourist cars as a percentage of total cars varies between 26% on
average in the winter and 59% in the summer (with much higher
figures in July-August);
• the estimated number of tourist cars over the whole of 2001 was 47%
of the total annual Bridge car flow;
• the toll expenditure by tourist cars in 2001 was approximately £1.3m.
The figures correspond (are triangulated against) very closely to the Scottish
Executive and INC studies and Tourist board figures.
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In addition to the car and caravan traffic, there will be tourists crossing the
Bridge by coach and motorcycle. Table 4.4 gives the crossings for 2001. No
figures are available for motorcycle through traffic, so we have assumed a 5%
through rate, as with cars. In any case the number will be small. Coach
through traffic is not split into midi and large coach2, as we have for the
Bridge crossings. We want to preserve this distinction for toll calculations, as
the seasonal variations are different for the two coach types. However, we
know the total coach through traffic for 2001 was 362 – 6% of the annual
coach Bridge traffic – so we have reduced the gross figures by this amount
for both coach types. Coach crossings here do not include service or school
buses.
Table 4.4 Motorcycle and Coach Crossings, Net of Through Traffic,
Skye Bridge, 2001
Month Motorcycle Large Coach Midi Coach
January 106 13 87
February 109 33 80
March 205 149 93
April 596 251 150
May 1,888 491 154
June 2,172 666 187
July 3,388 713 186
August 2,053 829 187
September 1,131 558 143
October 318 281 134
November 59 58 111
December 26 43 104
Total 12,050 4,086 1,618
Source: Scottish Executive (2002)
Previous studies have combined bus and coach traffic and estimated a split
between local and tourist traffic. As we have access to disaggregated figures
for coaches, midi coaches and service buses, we have taken all service bus
traffic to be local, and the majority of coach traffic to be tourists (see below).
The above table shows that midi coach traffic is much less seasonal than
                                                          
2 Cal Mac crossing figures by vehicle type are produced differently from Skye Bridge crossing figures. 
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motorcycle and large coach traffic and is therefore likely to incorporate a
higher local content. This is reflected in our calculations below. 
Using data from previous studies (see above) we have assumed that 90% of
motorcycle crossings year round are made by tourists. For coaches we have
taken the winter base in January (13 coaches) for coaches and February (80
midi coaches) as being local/non-tourist. Coach and midi coach usage above
these levels each month are assumed to be tourist traffic. While some of the
coaches and mini-coaches in January/February were undoubtedly for tourists,
this is balanced by probable greater usage by local groups other times of
years (although the numbers are still likely to be small). Discount tickets are
not available for coaches, so the current toll rates of £41.20 high
season/£27.90 low season for full-sized coaches and £23.70/£15.80 for midi-
coaches were used. The figures also assume that motorcycle tourists do not
use discount tickets, and have used the current rate of £2.90/£2.40. Using
these methods, Table 4.5 gives the estimated tourist traffic and toll revenue
in each category. 
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Table 4.5: Estimated Tourist Motorcycle and Coach Traffic and Toll
Revenue, Skye Bridge, 2001
Motorcycle Coach Midi Coach
Month Tourist
traffic
£ Toll
revenue
Tourist
traffic
£ Toll
revenue
Tourist
traffic
£ Toll
revenue
January 95 229 0 0 7 111
February 98 235 20 558 0 0
March 185 443 136 3,794 13 205
April 536 1,287 238 6,640 70 1,106
May 1,699 4,928 478 19,694 74 1,754
June 1,955 5,669 653 26,904 107 2,536
July 3,049 8,843 700 28,840 106 2,512
August 1,848 5,358 816 33,619 107 2,536
September 1,018 2,952 545 22,454 63 1,493
October 286 687 268 7,477 54 853
November 53 127 45 1,256 31 490
December 23 56 30 837 24 379
Total 10,846 £30,815 3,929 152,073 656 13,975
The results show:
 motorcycle tourist traffic reached a peak in July of 3,049, which is over
3,000 more than the December figure;
 total estimated motorcycle tourist toll revenue in 2001 was £30,815;
 large coach tourist traffic reached a peak in August of 816 coaches;
 total estimated large coach tourist toll revenue in 2001 was £152,073;
 midi coach tourist traffic reached a peak in June and August of 107
coaches – the figure from June-August was virtually constant;
 total estimated midi coach tourist toll revenue in 2001 was £13,975.
Although the monthly figures are only approximations, for example in reality
there will be some tourist large coach traffic in January, we believe the annual
figures give a good estimate of traffic and expenditure.
Taking all vehicle types together it is possible to estimate the total spent on
tolls by Skye tourists in 2001. From above there was £1,304,408 paid by
tourist cars and caravans, £30,815 by motorcycles, £152,073 by large coaches
and £13,975 by midi coaches, giving a total of £1,501,270. This is the
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amount by which tourists who crossed the bridge in 2001 would have been
better off had there been no toll charges.
Previous studies (INC, 1996) estimated that approximately 20% of the money
spent on tolls by tourists could be expected to enter the local economy if tolls
were abolished. Applying this to the estimated 2001 toll expenditure gives a
figure of £300,254 extra spending entering the local economy. However, not
all of this extra expenditure will be converted into income as much of it will
‘leak out’ of the local economy (e.g. to pay for ‘imported’ goods). The Scottish
Tourism Multiplier Study (STMS, Surrey Research Group, 1993) gives the
income multipliers from rural tourist expenditure as: direct, 0.2410; indirect,
0.0297; and induced, 0.0361. This gives a total ratio of income to expenditure
of approximately 0.31. Applying this to the potential income from tourism
entering the Skye economy if the tolls were removed gives a figure of
£93,079 per annum.
The employment effects of the lost tourist expenditure can also be calculated,
using the STMS which estimates that £29,240 (1991 prices) was needed to
create 1 FTE job. Scaling this up 33% to current prices based on the Retail
Price Index for 1991 and 2002, we estimate that £38,889 is needed to create
each FTE job (the STMS employment multiplier (£38,889) used is a Type II,
i.e. it includes induced effects.). This is in line with other studies such as RSPB
and BASC (1998) and Scottish Executive (1999b), and works out to give an
equivalent Scottish Executive employment multiplier effect of around 25,
which is less than that for Hotels and Catering, but greater than for Fish
Farming and many manufacturing industries. It has therefore been taken as a
reasonable approximation of a general employment multiplier for the local
economy and has been used throughout this chapter. Using this, therefore,
potential extra expenditure of £300,254 from the removal of the tolls would
create approximately 7.7 FTE jobs.
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4.3 Local Resident Spending
To estimate the cost of the tolls to local residents (excluding business traffic)
we have taken the Bridge traffic from Table 1.1 above and attempted to
isolate the local resident component in each case as described below.
• From the assumptions above, we have assumed 43% of car traffic to
be local resident (non-business) traffic.
• Local residents have been taken as comprising 10% of motorcycle
traffic. 
• The local component of coach and midi-coach traffic is the proportion
not included as tourist traffic above, i.e. the winter baseline monthly
figure multiplied by 12. 
• As we did not include bus traffic in the tourist figures, we have
included all bus traffic as local resident journeys.
• The Bridge crossing figures are for actual crossing, however, some
local residents will have purchased discount tickets which are unused,
so the total tolls paid will be somewhat larger than reported below.
Table 4.8 outlines our estimation of toll costs paid by local residents. Based
upon the DTZ Pieda study (Scottish Executive, 1999) it is suggested that
around 89% of frequent user local resident cars and motorcycles trips use
discount tickets (see appendix 2). It is assumed that buses always use the
discount rate. As local traffic is spread more evenly year round, we have
taken an average seasonal price for a full fare crossing and the current price
of a discount crossing. The pricing structure used is that outlined earlier. 
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Table 4.6: Estimated Annual Toll Charges Paid by Local Residents,
2001
Cars M/cycles Buses Large
coaches
Midi
coaches
Bridge Traffic net of
through traffic
575,761 12,050 4,006* 4,130 1,635
Estimated local
resident traffic
(43%)
247,577 1,205 4,006 156 972
Toll charges paid at
full price 
£137,270 £351 £0 £5,390 £19,197
Toll charges paid at
discount rate 
£286,203 £719 £49,114 £0 £0
Total tolls paid by
local residents
£423,473 £1,070 £49,114 £5,390 £19,197
*There are no through bus services to the Western Isles
This table provides an estimate of the toll charges paid by local residents
through each vehicle type. This shows that:
• local car drivers paid around £423,000 in toll charges;
• local motorcyclists paid around £1,000;
• service buses paid around £49,000;
• local residents paid around £5,300 through large coaches and around
£19,000 through midi coaches.
Summing the totals above, £498,244 was paid by local residents in non-
business toll charges in 2001. Local households (or local businesses where the
costs were not passed on) would have been better off by this amount had the
tolls not been levied.
Applying the STMS multiplier of 1.2 to this figure gives a potential £597,893
entering the Skye economy from local residents if the tolls wee lifted.
Likewise, estimating employment using the index linked employment
multiplier, £498,244 extra expenditure would create around 12.8 FTE jobs. 
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4.4 Local Businesses Spending
As with tourist traffic, the first stage in estimating the effect on local
businesses is to calculate the spending on tolls by local businesses. For Skye
businesses this will fall into three main streams:
• commercial vehicle costs of importing materials and supplies;
• commercial vehicle costs of exporting goods;
• additional costs of business visits, mainly by car, to customers, clients
and other events outside Skye.
The INC study (INC, 1996) estimated that around 40% of car traffic was local
resident non-business traffic, 50% was tourist traffic and the remainder was
split between local business and business visitor traffic. Our estimations above
show that around 47% of annual car traffic in 2001 was tourist traffic. In the
light of this tourist figure we have estimated for local resident traffic to be
43% of total car traffic and 10% to be local or visiting business traffic. INC
(1996) also showed the local business component to be around one third the
level of visiting business traffic, in accordance with this we have assumed 3%
of car traffic to be local business and 7% visiting business. 
In addition, as with coaches, the through traffic ferry figures are not broken
down by commercial vehicle type (LGV, HGV1 etc.), therefore we have
estimated through traffic for each vehicle type by calculating commercial
through traffic as a percentage of total commercial traffic (15%) and applying
this reduction to each vehicle class in turn. The INC report (INC, 1996) found
local commercial vehicle traffic to be around one quarter the volume of total
commercial traffic and we have applied this to the total through traffic figures
for all commercial vehicles (CVs).
The DTZ Pieda study (Scottish Executive, 1999) reported the findings of a
System Three household survey conducted in 1998, which found that 92% of
local business traffic used discount tickets and we have applied the same
proportion to all vehicles here. Table 4.6 outlines the estimated tolls paid in
each vehicle class by local businesses. 
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Table 4.7: Estimated Annual Toll Charges Paid by Local Business
Bridge Users, 2001
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (-15% of total for CVs)
563,339* 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated local business traffic
(3% of cars, 25% of CVs),
excluding through traffic
16,900 1,047 27,735 3,297
Toll charges paid at full price
(8% of vehicles)
£7,030 £905 £31,063 £7,358
Toll charges paid at discount rate
(92% of vehicles)
£20,834 £7,552 £258,475 £61,449
Total tolls paid by local
businesses
£27,864 £8,457 £289,537 £68,807
*From earlier calculations above
Summing the totals in each vehicle category gives a total of £394,665 paid
by local businesses. This is the amount by which local businesses would have
been better off had toll charges not been levied in 2001. Previous studies
have estimated that around 10% of this income would be lost to external
areas due to the external ownership of businesses based in Skye. Subtracting
this from the income saved gives a figure of £355,199 that would remain in
the local economy.
 
This expenditure would be subject to a multiplier effect, as local businesses
and residents spend money on local goods and services which themselves will
provide income for the local economy. The size of the multiplier will depend
on the size and nature of the area in question – the smaller the area the
greater the leakages on imported goods and services. For example the
multiplier for the HIE area would be larger than that for Skye. A number of
previous studies have used data from the STMS (Surrey Research Group,
1993) to estimate the value of the local multiplier, with values ranging from
1.2 to 1.6. However, the INC (1996) estimated multiplier of 1.2 for Skye
resident spending appears to be the most appropriate and is the one used
here. Applying this to the above figure gives a total income of £426,238 that
would enter the Skye economy from local businesses if tolls were lifted.
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To estimate employment created we have used the index linked STMS
employment multiplier of £38,889 per FTE from above. Applying this to the
basic expenditure would generate around 9.1 FTE jobs.
4.5 External Business Spending
As mentioned previously, there will be a proportion of cars and commercial
vehicles crossing the Bridge that will be business traffic from outside Skye,
mainly external suppliers. The toll charges spent by these firms are likely to
be passed on in part or in whole to local businesses and consumers. Feedback
from businesses that we contacted, including external businesses, indicated
that suppliers and couriers can pass on up to 100% of their additional costs to
local businesses and residents in terms of increased supply prices and
carriage rates. The INC (1996) study estimated that around 50% of these
costs would be passed on – we have taken 65% as a reasonable estimate
based upon our interviews, although it may be high depending upon the
industry and market. 
Related to the calculations for local businesses, we have made the following
assumptions when calculating current toll expenditure by visiting business:
• 7% of car traffic is visiting business traffic;
• 75% of commercial vehicle traffic is visiting business traffic;
• Our small number of interviews showed some use of discount tickets
by external businesses, however the level of use is likely to be less
than the 92% of local businesses. We have assumed 65% use.
Based on the above, Table 4.7 shows our estimations for toll spending by
external businesses. 
35
Table 4.8: Estimated Annual Toll Charges Paid by External Business
Bridge Users, 2001
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (15% of total for CVs)
563,339 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated external business traffic
(7% of cars, 75% of CVs)
39,434 3,141 83,204 9,890
Toll charges paid at full price
(35%)
£71,769 £11,873 £407,698 £96,579
Toll charges paid at discount rate
(65%)
£34,347 £16,007 £547,854 £130,245
Total tolls paid by external
businesses
£106,116 £27,881 £955,552 £226,824
Summing the spending by external businesses through all vehicle types gives
a total of £1,316,373. This is the amount by which external businesses
would be better off if the tolls were lifted. Using the assumption that 65% of
this cost is passed onto the Skye economy we can say that the local economy
would be better off by £855,642 if such costs were not passed on. 
Applying the STMS multiplier of 1.2 to this figure, we estimate that
£1,026,771 of extra income would enter the local economy from savings
made by external businesses if the tolls were removed.
Applying the STMS employment multiplier to the basic expenditure of
£855,642, we estimate that approximately 22 FTE jobs would be created.
4.6 Total Impact of Current Toll Expenditure
From the calculations above, we can estimate the total income that would
enter the Skye economy from diverted toll spending should the tolls be
abolished. Table 4.9 summarises our findings. 
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Table 4.9: Estimated Income and Employment From Diverted Toll
Spending
Source Estimated tolls
paid
Additional Income
(including multiplier
effects)
Employment
(FTE)
Tourist expenditure £1,501,294 £90,045 7.7
Local resident
Expenditure
£498,244 £597,893 12.8
Local business
expenditure
£394,665 £426,238 9.1
External business
expenditure
£1,316,373 £1,026,771 22.0
Total toll expenditure £3,710,576 £2,140,947 51.6
According to the estimates above for each group (tourists, residents, local
businesses, external businesses) the total tolls add up to £3.71m for 2001.
The actual tolls in 2000 were £3.78m, but there was a decline of just over 1%
in traffic to 2001, so actual tolls are expected to be around £3.73m (note that
our estimates are based on actual journeys while the toll figures include
discounted tickets purchased but not used). The total additional income
accruing to the local economy from spending by all the groups listed would be
over £2.1m and the employment generated would be over 51 FTE jobs. This
is equivalent to a 1.3% increase in the total employment of the Skye and
Lochalsh area. 
37
5. Additional Economic Impacts of Removing the Tolls
5.1 Introduction
Following a removal or reduction of the toll charges, in addition to the
additional income and employment that would be generated in the Skye
economy from diverted toll expenditure, there would be further benefits in
terms of:
• extra visitor numbers attracted by the lower or free tolls;
• increased business activity and efficiency from lower supply and
export costs.
5.2 Increased Visitor Numbers
To illustrate the dependence of the local economy on tourism based
employment, the report by DTZ Pieda (Scottish Executive, 1999) states, with
reference to the Skye economy, that ‘The other sector [other than Agriculture
and Fishing] with substantial over-representation is distribution, hotels and
catering, which is effectively the tourism industry’. Our figures, given in the
Appendix 1, agree with this – Skye has almost double the national average
percentage employment in this group. Figures from the ONS Annual Business
Enquiry (2000) show employment in the Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise (SALE)
area in distributon, hotels and restaurants to be 1,637: 903 (55%) full-time
and 734 (45%) part-time, giving a total of 1,230 FTE jobs. This figure relates
to employees only and excludes self-employed, as self-employed figures by
sector for the SALE area are suppressed by ONS as statistically unreliable.
1991 Census figures showed that there were 1,246 self-employed in all
sectors in the SALE area (HIE, 1999). Although somewhat out of date, this is
the only census-type information on self-employment available at local level.
Assuming that the proportion of self-employed in distribution, hotels and
restaurants reflects that of employees (which is likely to be a conservative
estimate), we can assume approximately 40% or 500 people to be self-
employed in tourism, and assuming 55% of these to be full-time and 45%
part-time, this gives 375 FTE self-employed jobs. The total current number of
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FTE employees and self-employed in tourism in the SALE area in is therefore
estimated at around 1,605. 
To estimate the potential increase in tourist visitors from the abolition of toll
charges we have used our own calculations of the price elasticity of demand
for Bridge travel by tourists, based largely on results from the System Three
tourist survey (System Three, 1996). Price elasticity measures how responsive
or sensitive demand for a good or service is to changes in its price. In this
case the price is the level of the toll. Details of these calculations are provided
in Appendix 3. The provisional figure is a long-run price elasticity of 0.1, in
other words if the price of the Bridge was increased by 100%, visitor numbers
would drop by 10%, and vice-versa for a decrease in price. 
Using the proposed reduced tolls, given in Table 5.1, we have used the 2001
traffic figures to calculate the likely increase in tourist traffic resulting from
the abolition of the toll charges. A countervailing issue is that a toll-free
Bridge may divert passengers from the Mallaig-Armadale or Glenelg ferries.
However, the Bridge could increase the number of tourists doing a semi-
circular trip over the Bridge and back by the ferry or vice-versa. In any case,
loss of ferry traffic to the bridge is likely to have the effect of redistributing
economic activity rather than decreasing it.
Table 5.1: Projected Tourist Traffic After Toll Abolition
Traffic with toll Increase 10% Traffic with no toll
Car 350,658 35,066 385,724
Motorcycle 10,846 1,085 11,931
Coach 3,928 393 4,351
Midi Coach 659 66 725
All modes 366,091 36,610 402,701
We had considerable difficulty in obtaining accurate figures for visitor
numbers to Skye and/or Skye and Lochalsh. Official figures by Visit Scotland
and Highlands of Scotland Tourist Board (HOST) are only broken down as far
as HOST level. Figures are available for numbers to Tourist Information
Centres (TICs), although not all tourists will visit these facilities (HOST,
2002b). However, figures from the Volume and Value of Tourism Factsheet
(HIE, 2000) visitor numbers gives the estimated number of trips in Skye and
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Lochalsh in 2000 as 427,686 with a corresponding expenditure of £65.7m.
Previous studies (Skye Data Atlas, 1994) have estimated visitor numbers in
Skye at around 500,000, so although the HIE estimate also includes Lochalsh,
the figure seem reasonable. Taking the 427,686 figure as a base and using
the price elasticity of 0.1, abolition of the tolls would lead to an increase in
tourist trips and expenditure of 10% resulting in an additional 42,769 trips. At
an average visitor spend of £153.62 per trip (HIE, 2000), this would result in
an additional £6,570,000 expenditure in the local economy.
As before, assuming an income multiplier of 0.31 this would result in an
additional £2,036,700 of income and applying the employment multiplier, an
additional 169 FTE jobs.
5.3 Increased Business Activity and Efficiency
Removal or lowering of the tolls could result in a number of changes in the
local economy as a result of more favourable trading conditions:
• new indigenous businesses may be set up;
• there may be an increase in inward investment;
• existing businesses may expand output and employment.
New Indigenous and Inward Investment Start-ups
Table 5.2 below shows that the SALE area experienced one of the biggest
drops (-44.7%) in new business start-ups over the period 1997-2000. This
was worse than both the HIE area (-26.5%) and Scotland as a whole (-
30.9%). However, over the sub-period 1999-2000 it was the best performing
LEC area, showing growth of 19.7%. The accuracy of these figures could
perhaps be questioned. Assuming that they accurately reflect economic
activity this would indicate at first glance that the tolls may have had a
negative then effect initially, but this is becoming less of a problem. The
introduction of discount tickets in January 1998 may have helped this,
particularly as over 90% of local businesses use these. 
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Table 5.2: Number Of Start-ups By LEC Area and Percentage Change
On 1997 & 1999
Number of New
Starts 2000 
% Change on
1997 
% Change on
1999
SE 85 -35.6  -24.8
WIE 103 -44.9 -22.0
RACE 134 -34.3 -15.7
AIE 291 -32.0 -13.1
LLtd 99 -18.2 -8.3
CASE 120 -48.3 -7.0
INE 367 -19.5 -6.6
MBSE 409 -13.5 -4.7
OE 123 -6.8 -0.8
SALE 73 -44.7 19.7
HIE 1,804 -26.5 -9.0
Rest of Scotland 15,423 -30.9 -10.9
Scotland 17,114 -30.9 -10.2
Source: HIE (2001)
Consultation with SALE revealed that the direct effect of the toll charges is felt
to be marginal upon the number of start-ups in the local area. Toll charges
are a cost to business, but it is likely that other factors such as the
effectiveness of business start-up programmes, availability of industrial space
and high travel costs in general and outweigh much of the deterrent effect of
the tolls. There would be some indirect effect, for example through increased
tourism, that would lead to greater consumer and business demand and
hence more business opportunity, however this is included in the multiplier
effects of the tourism estimates and would be double counting. 
In the absence of any estimates or studies on the effect on business start-ups
to provide better estimates than above, we have assumed a conservative 5%
in the increase in the number of business start-ups resulting from removal of
the toll charges. This would have resulted in an extra 4 business start-ups in
2001. The average new start-up in Scotland in 2000 had 5.5 employees
(Scottish Executive, 2002b), however, the size on Skye is likely to be smaller.
Assuming each new start up created 3 employees, the extra 4 start-up
businesses resulting from removal of the tolls would create an extra 12 FTE
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jobs. At the current average annual salary for the SALE area of £14,000 these
would generate an additional £168,000 of income to the local economy.
Existing Business Efficiency
Previous studies have estimated removal of the tolls would result in a 5%
increase in employment through increased efficiency of local businesses.
Businesses that would benefit most (other than tourist-dependent businesses,
which are covered above) would be those who export and import supplies. 
The two principal exporting sectors in Skye as defined by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC 92) are Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Manufacturing
(Scottish Executive, 1999). ONS Annual Business Inquiry figures show that
there are 98 and 33 employers respectively in each sector in the Skye
Enterprise (SALE) area, employing 346 and 122 people respectively – a total
of 468 employees. This total includes some employment on the mainland
(who may also benefit), but excludes employment in group 0010 agriculture,
for which no data are available at this level. We have therefore taken this as
an approximation for the numbers employed in these two sectors on Skye.
An increase of 5% employment would provide an extra 23 jobs, taking the
total employment in export related industries to 491. Such an increase may
also have a multiplier effect on other industries (perhaps of 4-5 jobs).
Assuming that these extra jobs are paid at the annual average salary for the
SALE area of £14,000 p.a., this will generate an additional £322,000 of
income to the local economy.
5.4 Total Additional Economic Growth
Summing the above calculations we can estimate the total income and
employment benefits to the local economy resulting from increased tourism,
an increase in business start-ups and increased local business efficiency.
Table 5.3 summarises this.
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Table 5.3 Estimated Additional Growth Benefits from Toll Removal
Source Additional Income
(including multipliers)
Employment (FTE)
Increased tourism £2,036,700 169
Business start-ups £168,000 12
Business efficiency £322,000 23
Total £2,526,700 204
This shows that the total additional economic benefit from removing the tolls
would be around £2.5m additional income, and around 200 additional FTE
jobs – equivalent to an increase in 5% in current total employment in the
SALE area.
5.5 Total Impact of Toll Removal
Adding the above benefits to those from the diverted existing toll expenditure
in Table 4.9 gives the following total potential increase in employment and
income resulting from removal of the tolls.
Table 5.4: Total Additional Income and Expenditure from Toll
Removal
Income Employment (FTE)
Diverted existing expenditure £2,140,947 51.6
Additional Growth £2,526,700 204
Total £4,667,647 255.6
The total benefits from removal of the tolls are therefore estimated to be
around £4.67m additional income to the local economy and a corresponding
additional 256 FTE jobs. This represents a potential 6.3% increase over
current employment in the SALE area.
5.6 Buying-out the Bridge
The Scottish Executive has not estimated a precise cost of buying out the
bridge to date. Earlier estimates in a written parliamentary reply in 1997
revealed that it would be likely to cost around £30 million to buy out the tolls,
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so it is likely that the cost would now be less after 5 years of toll income.
SKAT estimate that the cost of buying out the bridge should now be less than
£20m, however they state that this figure is dependent upon whether the
Bank of America have been guaranteed a minimum level of profit, which may
increase the cost of a buy-out. 
Figures from the National Audit Office (based around 2000) are claimed to
reveal that the total toll payments to be paid to Skye Bridge Ltd was to be
£128m over the lifetime of the concession (approximately 17 years in
duration). However, the cost of buy out was not estimated by the NAO as the
figure would be dependent upon negotiation between the Scottish Executive
and Skye Bridge Ltd. It is likely that it would currently (2002) take at least
£23m (to cover debts), plus whatever else extra Skye Bridge Ltd. negotiated,
to buy out the bridge. With the lack of transparency concerning this public
infrastructure it is not possible to estimate total costs or to consider value for
money.
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6. Economic Impacts of Reduced Toll Charges
6.1 Introduction
In addition to estimating the economic impacts of toll removal, we have also
estimated the likely impacts of a partial reduction in toll charges. Partial
reduction is likely to result in the same types of positive economic benefits to
be gained from toll removal, but of a smaller magnitude. Reducing the tolls
need not set a precedent for other Public Private Partnership (Private Finance
Initiative) schemes, as the tolls have already been effectively reduced with
the introduction of the discount tickets. We have developed two scenarios
here, both of which offer substantial savings over the current toll charges:
A) a flat charge of £1 each way for cars, with charges for other vehicles
scaled from this figure;
B) a lower charging structure, taking the higher of the actual charges on
the Forth Road Bridge for each vehicle category.
6.2 Setting the Charges
Interviews with local businesses and residents revealed that a one-way flat
charge of £1 for cars, and this was used as a benchmark for Scenario A. This
equates as approximately 2.5 times the return trip level for the Forth Road
Bridge, and this figure has been applied to scale up the other charges to give
Scenario A (i.e. the current Forth Road Bridge charges for buses etc. have
been scaled up by 2.5). Scenario B was taken to be the higher of the current
Forth and Erskine Bridge charges in each vehicle category, which in practice
turns out to be the Forth Bridge charges in every case. Table 6.1 below shows
our hypothetical reduced toll structure, based on a return trip. 
Table 6.1: Round Trip Reduced Toll Charges for the Skye Bridge
Cars M/cycles Buses and
coaches
HGVs
Forth Road Bridge 80p Free £1.40 £2.00
Erskine Bridge 60p Free 60p 60p
Scenario A £2 Free £3.50 £5.00
Scenario B 80p Free £1.40 £2.00
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6.3 Tourism
Using the same methodology as for the complete removal of toll charges
above, the impact of a reduction in toll charges was calculated. 
Scenario A
Table 6.2 illustrates the savings to be made over the full price tolls by
adopting Scenario A.
Table 6.2: Scenario A Saving Over Existing Tolls by Tourists
Cars Motorcycles Coaches Midi
Coaches
Total
Full price toll
expenditure
£1,304,408 £30,815 £152,073 £13,975 £1,501,271
Scenario A toll
expenditure
£267,150 £0 £6,876 £1,148 £275,174
Saving £1,037,258 £30,815 £145,197 £12,827 £1,226,097
This reduced toll structure gives a potential saving from diverted current
expenditure of £1,037,258 for tourists driving cars and cars with caravans,
£30,815 for motorcycles, £145,197 for large coaches and £12,827 by midi
coaches. This sums to a total potential saving of £1,226,097 and is the
amount by which tourists who visited in 2001 would have been better off
under Scenario A. Applying the same methodology as for removal of tolls
above, an estimated 20%, or £245,219 of this would be spent in the local
economy, resulting in £76,018 additional income and an extra 6.3 FTE jobs. 
In addition, as with the total toll removal, it is necessary to estimate the
increase in tourist numbers that would result from a reduction in toll charges.
A charge of £1 each way represents a saving of £4.20 over the annual
average car toll, a reduction of 81%. Assuming that all vehicle types are
subject to the same demand responsiveness as cars, applying our price
elasticity of demand of 0.1 as before should result in an extra 8.1% tourist
trips. Based on 427,686 trips annually to Skye (from section 5.2 above), the
total increase in tourist trips would be 34,643. This would result in extra
tourist spending of £5,321,791 (£153.62 per trip - HIE, 2000). As before,
assuming an income multiplier of 0.31 this would result in an additional
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£1,649,755 of income and applying the employment multiplier, an additional
136.8 FTE jobs.
Summing the total impact of diverted existing toll expenditure and additional
tourist visits, we estimate that Scenario A would lead to additional income of
£1,725,773 and 143.1 extra FTE jobs. These figures are not far short
(around 80%) of our earlier estimates for the equivalent income and
employment benefits from tourism following total removal of the tolls.
Scenario B
Table 6.3 illustrates the savings to be made over the full price tolls by
adopting Scenario B (tolls equivalent to the Forth Road Bridge).
Table 6.3: Scenario B Saving Over Existing Tolls by Tourists
Cars Motorcycles Coaches Midi
Coaches
Total
Full price toll
expenditure
£1,304,408 £30,815 £152,073 £13,975 £1,501,271
Scenario B toll
expenditure
£106,860 £0 £2,750 £459 £110,069
Saving £1,197,548 £30,815 £149,322 £13,516 £1,391,202
This reduced structure gives a potential saving from diverted current
expenditure of £1,197,548 for tourists driving cars and cars with caravans,
£30,815 for motorcycles, £149,322 for large coaches and £13,516 for midi
coaches. This sums to a total potential saving of £1,391,202 if the tolls were
reduced to these levels. Applying the same methodology as above, an
estimated 20%, or £278,240 of this would be spent in the local economy,
resulting in £86,254 additional income and an extra 7.2 FTE jobs. These
figures are similar the above estimates for the total removal of the tolls.
The additional tourist numbers from Scenario B can be calculated as before.
For cars, the reduction of a one-way equivalent price from a seasonal average
of £5.20 to 40p represents a fall of 92%. Assuming again that all vehicle
types are subject to the same demand responsiveness as cars, applying our
price elasticity of demand of 0.1 as before should result in 9.2% extra tourist
trips. Based on 427,686 trips annually to Skye (from section 5.2 above), the
total increase in tourist trips would be 39,347. This would result in extra
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tourist spending of £6,044,486 (£153.62 per trip - HIE, 2000). As before,
assuming an income multiplier of 0.31 this would result in an additional
£1,873,791 of income and applying the employment multiplier, and applying
the employment multiplier, an additional 155.4 FTE jobs.
Summing the total impact of diverted existing toll expenditure and additional
tourist visits, we estimate that Scenario B would lead to additional income of
£1,960,045 and an extra 162.6 FTE jobs.
6.4 Local Residents
As with the tourism estimates, the same methodology has been used to
calculate the private local resident benefits from a reduction in toll charges as
was used above for the total removal of charges. 
Scenario A
The reduced charges outlined in Table 6.1 result in the following savings,
outlined in Table 6.4 below. We have assumed that, as before, 89% of local
resident car and motorcycles use discount tickets.
With lower tolls there would be some increase in the number of trips by local
residents (and businesses). We have no evidence on the size of the price
elasticity of demand for such trips, although its effects are likely to be
insignificant, especially as most residents already use discount tickets, and so
it is omitted from the calculations below.
Table 6.4: Local Resident Saving by Adopting Scenario A Reduced
Toll charges
Cars M/cycles Buses Large
coaches
Midi
coaches
All
Saving over full
price toll
£110,872 £351 £0 £5,117 £17,496 £133,836
Saving over
discount toll
£72,619 £719 £42,103 N/A N/A £115,440
Total saving £183,490 £1,070 £42,103 £5,117 £17,496 £249,276
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This shows that local residents would save a total of £249,276 from the
introduction of the reduced tolls. The majority (£183,490) of this saving would
be made by car drivers, although this is much less than the £423,473 that
would saved by local resident car drivers if the toll was removed, as the £1
saving is not much of a reduction over the discount rate, which most locals
pay. Therefore the reduced toll saving under Scenario A by local residents is
much smaller than the savings by tourists. In addition there would be an
increase in the number of local resident trips over the bridge, and this would
lead to a reduced savings. Applying the local spending multiplier of 1.2 to this
amount gives an estimated £301,288 entering the local economy if the tolls
were reduced to these levels. Applying the employment multiplier, we
estimate that this would also lead to 6.5 FTE jobs.
Scenario B
The reduced charges (see Table 6.1) result in the following savings, outlined
in Table 6.5 below. We have assumed that:
• as before, 89% of local resident car and motorcycles use discount
tickets.
Table 6.5: Local Resident Saving by Adopting Scenario B Reduced
Toll charges
Cars M/cycles Buses Large
coaches
Midi
coaches
All
Saving over full
price toll
£126,710 £351 - £5,281 £18,517 £150,859
Saving over
discount toll
£200,769 £719 £46,309 - - £247,797
Total saving £327,479 £1,070 £46,309 £5,281 £18,517 £398,656
This shows that local residents would save a total of £398,656 from the
introduction of the reduced tolls in Scenario B. The majority (£327,479) of
this saving would be made by car drivers, this figure is notably higher than
the saving by local car drivers under Scenario A. Applying the local spending
multiplier of 1.2 to the total amount gives an estimated £478,387 entering
the local economy if the tolls were reduced to these levels. Applying the
employment multiplier, we estimate that this would also lead to 10.3 FTE
jobs.
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6.5 Local Business
Using the same assumptions as in section 4.3 we have estimated the savings
that would be made by local businesses by the adoption of reduced toll
charges.
Scenario A
Table 6.6 below gives the estimated savings by local businesses by adopting
the reduced charges in Scenario A.
Table 6.6: Local Business Saving by Adopting Scenario A Reduced
Toll charges
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (-15% of total for CVs)
563,339 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated local business traffic
(3% of cars, 25% of CVs),
excluding through traffic
16,900 1,047 27,734 3,297
Toll charges saved by full price
users (8% of vehicles)
£5,678 £821 £25,516 £6,699
Toll charges saved by discount
rate users (92% of vehicles)
£5,286 £6,588 £194,685 £53,866
Total saving £10,965 £7,409 £220,200 £60,565
Summing the totals in each vehicle category gives a total of £299,139 paid
by local businesses. This is the amount by which local businesses would be
better off had toll charges been levied at the reduced level in 2001. As with
the total removal scenario in section 4.3, we assume that around 10% of this
income would be lost to external areas due to the external ownership of
businesses based in Skye. Subtracting this from the saved gives a figure of
£269,225 that would remain in the local economy. 
Applying appropriate multipliers to the above figure gives an estimated
additional £323,070 of income entering the economy and an estimated
additional 6.9 FTE jobs.
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Scenario B
Table 6.7 below gives the estimated savings by local businesses by adopting
the reduced charges in Scenario B.
Table 6.7: Local Business Saving by Adopting Scenario B Reduced
Toll charges
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (-15% of total for CVs)
563,339 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated local business traffic
(3% of cars, 25% of CVs),
excluding through traffic
16,900 1,047 27,734 3,297
Toll charges saved by full price
users (8% of vehicles)
£6,490 £871 £28,844 £7,095
Toll charges saved by discount
rate users (92% of vehicles)
£14,615 £7,166 £232,958 £58,415
Total saving £21,105 £8,038 £261,802 £65,510
Summing the totals in each vehicle category gives a total of £356,454 paid
by local businesses. This is the amount by which local businesses would be
better off had toll charges been levied at the reduced level in 2001. As with
the total removal scenario in section 4.3, we assume that around 10% of this
income would be lost to external areas due to the external ownership of
businesses based in Skye. Subtracting this from the saved gives a figure of
£320,809 that would remain in the local economy. 
Applying appropriate multipliers to the above figure gives an estimated
additional £384,971 of income entering the economy and an estimated
additional 8.2 FTE jobs.
6.6 External Businesses
Based on the same assumptions as made for external businesses as in Section
4.4, i.e.:
• 65% of costs incurred by external businesses are passed on to local
businesses and residents; 
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• 7% of car traffic is visiting business traffic;
• 75% of commercial vehicle traffic is visiting business traffic;
• 65% of external business traffic uses discount tickets;
we have estimated the likely impact of increased external business spending
by adopting reduced toll charges.
Scenario A
Table 6.8 shows our estimations for toll spending by external businesses
under reduction Scenario A. 
Table 6.8: External Business Saving by Adopting Scenario A Reduced
Toll charges
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (15% of total for CVs)
563,339 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated external business traffic
(7% of cars, 75% of CVs)
39,434 3,141 83,204 9,890
Toll saving over full price toll (35%
of vehicles)
£57,968 £10,774 £334,895 £87,925
Toll saving over discount toll (65%
of vehicles)
£8,715 £13,965 £412,648 £114,174
Total saving by external
businesses
£66,682 £24,739 £747,543 £202,098
Summing the saving by external businesses through all vehicle types gives a
total of £1,041,063. This is the amount by which external businesses would
be better off if the tolls were reduced. Using the assumption that 65% of this
cost is passed onto the Skye economy we can say that the local economy
would be better off by £676,691 if such costs were not passed on. 
Applying the STMS multiplier of 1.2 to this figure, we estimate that £812,029
of extra income would enter the local economy from savings made by
external businesses if the tolls were reduced. Applying the STMS employment
multiplier to the basic expenditure of £676,691, we estimate that
approximately 17.4 FTE jobs would be created under Scenario A.
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Scenario B
Table 6.9 shows our estimations for toll spending by external businesses
under reduction Scenario B. 
Table 6.9: External Business Saving by Adopting Scenario B Reduced
Toll charges
Cars LGV HGV1 HGV2
Total traffic 603,185 4,927 130,515 15,514
Bridge Traffic net of through
traffic (15% of total for CVs)
563,339 4,188 110,938 13,187
Estimated external business traffic
(7% of cars, 75% of CVs)
39,434 3,141 83,204 9,890
Toll saving over full price toll (35%
of vehicles)
£66,249 £11,434 £378,576 £93,117
Toll saving over discount toll (65%
of vehicles)
£24,094 £15,190 £493,772 £123,817
Total saving by external
businesses
£90,343 £26,624 £872,348 £216,934
Summing the saving by external businesses through all vehicle types gives a
total of £1,206,249. This is the amount by which external businesses would
be better off if the tolls were reduced. Using the assumption that 65% of this
cost is passed onto the Skye economy we can say that the local economy
would be better off by £784,062 if such costs were not passed on. 
Applying the STMS multiplier of 1.2 to this figure, we estimate that £940,874
of extra income would enter the local economy from savings made by
external businesses if the tolls were reduced.
Applying the STMS employment multiplier to the basic expenditure of
£784,062, we estimate that approximately 20.2 FTE jobs would be created
under Scenario B.
6.7 Additional Business Start-ups
The absence of any estimates or studies on the effect on business start-ups
as mentioned in section 5.3 above, means that we have used our earlier
assumption of a 5% increase in the number of business start-ups, or 4 extra
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businesses resulting from total removal of the toll charges, an extra 12 FTE
jobs and an additional £168,000 of income to the local economy.
Scenario A
The above estimates of the income and employment benefits from Scenario A
are approximately 80% that for the complete removal of the tolls. Accordingly
we estimate that under Scenario A there would be an increase of around 3
extra businesses, generating 9 FTE jobs and £126,000 of income to the local
economy.
Scenario B
Likewise, with Scenario B, the impacts above are around 90% that for total
removal of the tolls. We would therefore estimate that under Scenario B there
would be a similar impact to the toll removal, i.e. 4 extra businesses, an extra
12 FTE jobs and an additional £168,000 of income to the local economy.
6.8 Increased Business Efficiency
We assume from section 5.3 that removal of the tolls results in a 5% increase
in employment through increased efficiency of local businesses and that this
would be manifested mainly in export dependent businesses, providing an
extra 23 jobs, and at an average salary of £14,000, generating an additional
£322,000 of income to the local economy.
Scenario A
As with the start-ups Scenario A assumes this will result in approximately
80% of the employment increase of the toll removal. This would result in an
additional 18 FTE jobs and an additional £252,000 income.
Scenario B
Under the same assumptions, Scenario B would result in 90% of the
employment increase generated by toll removal. This would create 21 FTE
jobs and £294,000 income.
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6.9 Total Impact of Reduced Toll Scenarios
The combined income and employment generated from each scenario is
compared in table 6.10 below. This shows that:
• Scenario A generates an additional £3.54m of income and 200 FTE
jobs, around 4.8% of current employment in the SALE area;
• Scenario B generates an additional £4.14m income and 235 FTE jobs,
around 5.7% of current employment in the SALE area.
Table 6.10: Summary of Estimated Income and Employment Gains
from Reduced Toll Charges
Scenario A Scenario BSource
Income Employment Income Employment
Tourism (existing and
additional)
£1,725,773 143.1 £1,960,045 162.6
Local residents £301,288 6.5 £478,387 10.3
Local business £323,070 6.9 £384,971 8.2
External business £812,029 17.4 £855,642 20.2
Additional business start-
ups
£126,000 9.0 £168,000 12.0
Extra business efficiency £252,000 18.0 £294,000 21.0
Total £3,540,160 200.9 £4,141,045 234.3
Scenario B involves the greater toll reduction and is therefore expected to
generate more additional income and employment than Scenario A. If we
compare the overall income and employment generated with that of removing
the tolls from Table 5.4 above, which shows £4.67m additional income and a
corresponding additional 256 FTE jobs, we can conclude that Scenario A
provides around 76% of the potential income and 78% of the potential
employment benefits, and Scenario B provides 89% of the income and 91%
of the employment benefits of complete toll removal.
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7. Conclusions
We can offer the following conclusions from this study.
1. Although the Bridge has been of benefit to Skye, the high levels of the
toll have considerably reduced its potential positive impact upon the
local economy.
2. There is considerable local resentment to the tolls, particularly among
businesses who report that tourists, particularly short stay visitors and
coach parties, have been deterred from crossing the bridge
3. There would be likely gains from removing or reducing the tolls in
terms of diverting existing toll spending, increased tourism, increased
business efficiency and more business start-ups.
4. The economic benefits from removing the tolls would be substantial,
with around £4.67m of additional income entering the local economy
and the creation of perhaps 250 FTE jobs (around 6% of current Skye
and Lochalsh Enterprise area employment).
5. There would also be noticeable benefits from reducing the toll charges,
with one scenario (based upon a car toll of £1 each way) offering
around 76% of the potential income and 78% of the potential
employment benefits, and the other scenario (based upon Forth Road
Bridge tolls levels) resulting in 89% of the income and 91% of the
employment benefits of complete toll removal.
6. It is difficult to justify the one year expiry for discount tickets as this
inevitably means local residents are paying higher than otherwise tolls
as unused tickets become out of date, or it is impossible to buy
discounted tickets for only a few journeys.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk
Road Assessment report (SACTRA, 1999) stated that transport infrastructure
could create economic growth, provided the economic conditions were right:
that the economy in question had a low level of existing infrastructure; and
that supporting economic development policies were in place. Given that from
the consultations it would appear that removing or reducing the toll levels
would effectively be freeing up the use of a piece of infrastructure, we should
perhaps treat such an action as an additional piece of investment. The level of
transport infrastructure in Skye is relatively under-developed, therefore with
support from accompanying economic development policies it is likely that we
would see economic benefits from any increase in bridge traffic.
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Appendix 1:  The Skye Economy
Overview
Skye is taken to be the Skye and Lochalsh Local Enterprise Company (SALE)
area for the purposes of this report. This is one of ten LECs that fall under the
remit of Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE). HIE statistics indicate the
general characteristics of Skye to be:
• 3.2% of the total HIE population in 1998;
• a slowly rising, but ageing, population;
• falling unemployment rates over the period 1996-1999 (Skye and
Ullapool TTWA);
• an economy dominated by small firms;
• a level of business start-ups higher than the HIE or Scottish average.
Population
The population figures for the Skye shown a slight growth over the past
decade as shown in Table A1 below. The increase in population is greater
than that for the HIE area or Scotland as a whole.
Table A1: Population Levels and Change, 1991-1998
1991 1995 1998 2002 % change
Skye & Lochalsh 11,740 11,940 11,980 12,130 +3%
HIE Area 369,320 372,790 370,376 373,000 +1%
Scotland 5,107,000 5,136,600 5,120,000 5,100,000 -0.1%
Source: GRO(Scotland), HIE
The population of Skye has seen the fastest growth in the older age groups,
indicating that it may be seen as a desirable place to retire. This is not
necessarily a negative aspect as many retirees have considerable spending
power. Table A2 highlights that the increases in population have been
confined to the 45-64 and over 85 age groups.
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Table A2: % Population by Age, Skye, 1991-1998
Age Band 1991 1998 % change
0-4 6.3 5.8 -8%
5-19 19.9 19.0 -5%
20-44 33.9 30.9 -9%
45-64 22.2 27.0 +22%
65-84 15.6 14.6 -6%
85+ 2.1 2.6 +24%
Employment and Industry
Table A3 provides an overview of the employment structure of the Skye area.
This highlights the high dependence on Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants
and Agriculture & Fishing compared with the Scottish average. The figures do
not include self-employed, as this data is suppressed by ONS as being
statistically unreliable.
Table A3: Employment by Industry Sector, 2000
Skye Scotland
Persons % Persons %
Agriculture & fishing 346 8.5 38,317 1.7
Energy and Water 36 0.9 36,431 1.6
Manufacturing 122 3 302,473 13.6
Construction 127 3.1 132,351 5.9
Distribution, hotels
and restaurants
1,637 40.1 506,379 22.7
Transport and
communication
313 7.7 117,537 5.3
Banking, finance and
insurance
400 9.8 374,870 16.8
Public administration,
education and health
974 23.9 599,575 26.9
Other services 126 3.1 121,266 5.4
Total 4,082 100 2,229,199 100
Source: ONS Annual Business Enquiry
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Unemployment and Social Exclusion
Table A4 below shows that although unemployment has fallen in Skye, this
fall has been less than in Scotland as a whole, possibly indicating that the
area has not benefited from the economic upturn to the same extent as other
regions. 
Table A4: Average Annual Unemployment Claimant Count, 1995-
2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % change
Skye &
Lochalsh
523 464 432 390 332 342 -35%
Scotland 195,063 159,560 141,489 133,796 119,413 108,025 -45%
In addition, the area appears to suffer from a relatively high level of long-
term unemployment. Figures from HIE show that in 1999 47% of unemployed
in Skye had been out of work for over 6 months, compared with 38% in the
wider HIE area.  
As mentioned above, employment in Skye is heavily dependent on tourism
and is therefore seasonal in nature. Table A5 illustrates this by highlighting
the higher levels of unemployment during winter months: from a low in 242
in September to a high of 465 in February.
Table A5: Unemployment Claimant Count, SALE Area, 2001
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Month Persons
January 2001 448
February 2001 465
March 2001 459 
April 2001 361 
May 2001 308
June 2001 281
July 2001 256
August 2001 254
September 2001 242 
October 2001 243 
November 2001 347 
December 2001 407
Skye Bridge Traffic
As mentioned in the body of the report there were 666,321 vehicle crossings
in 2001. The breakdown by vehicle sector is provided in Table 1.1 and the
long term trend in Table 1.2.
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Appendix 2: Calculation of Visitor Numbers
1. Applying the Scottish Executive (1999) Skye Bridge Ltd. data for discounted
tickets sold April-September estimate of 38% of car traffic using discounts
and is ‘local’ (based on 1998) to 2001 figures gives:
37,958 tourist cars per month and 23,265 ‘local’ traveller cars per month.
However, two modifications need to be made: 
a) The Scottish Executive report (1999, para 8.6) argues that for residents
using the Bridge monthly or more often, 76%-84% always pay the reduced
charge while 9% usually pay the reduced charge. We assume that: 89% of
local resident trips use discount tickets; the lower frequency of discount
tickets amongst those who use the Bridge less often is balanced by frequent
users who often, but not always, use discount tickets. Also most of the Bridge
trips will be made by frequent users. 
b) Another (System Three) study suggested 2% of tourist use discount
tickets. So these have been added back in and the final ‘local’ figure
calculated from this. This results in the estimates of: 
35,889 tourist cars per month and 25,334 ‘local’ traveller cars per month
during the summer (April-September).
2. Applying the Scottish Executive (1999) Skye Bridge Ltd data for discounted
tickets sold October-March estimate of 34% of car traffic using discounts and
is ‘local’ (based on 1998) to 2001 figures gives:
8,636 tourist cars per month and 24,031 ‘local’ traveller cars per month
during the winter (October-March).
Together these give an annual tourist figure of: 267,150 tourists ‘cars’, or
47% (this compares with the INC (1996) figure of 50%).
All of the results depend on the accuracy of the different surveys and the
assumptions stated. The number of visitors to Tourist Information Centres
(2001/02) suggest 4102 visitors per month to them in winter (October-March)
(so 47% of visiting ‘cars’) and 30,921 per month in summer (including the
Kyle of Lochalsh office) (86% of visiting ‘cars’). 
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3. Applying the Scottish Executive (1999) August estimate of 78% of car
traffic as tourists (based on 1998) to 2001 figures gives:
63983 tourist cars and 18047 ‘local’ travellers. 
Applying the Scottish Executive (1999) July-September estimate of 72% of
car traffic as tourists (based on 1998) to 2001 figures gives:
 50,430 per month tourist cars and 19,612 ‘local’ traveller cars.
According to Tourist Information Centre figures for Portree (open all year)
about 55% of all their visitors come in July-September (HOST, 2002b).
Applying this ratio to our total tourist car numbers this would be 48,978 per
month (very close to the 50,430 calculated above in the Scottish Executive
report). This suggests that the summer visitor figures may be underestimated
if the survey above is accurate.
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Appendix 3: Calculation of Price Elasticity of Demand
This appendix sets out the method used to calculate the price elasticity of
demand for travel over the Skye Bridge. Price elasticity is a measure of how
sensitive the number of vehicles crossing the bridge is to a change in price.
For example, a reduction in the toll charge for cars of £1 will result in an
increase in bridge traffic – the price elasticity figure is a measure of by how
much traffic will change. It is not possible to calibrate a sophisticated model
of elasticity given the available data, but a reasonably robust estimate can be
made.
1. Price elasticity of demand (PeD) is calculated using the formula:
PeD = % change in quantity demanded / % change in price
2. The higher the PeD, the more responsive demand for a product or service
(in this case bridge travel) will be to a change in price.
3. We have estimated PeD using the results of the System Three (1996)
tourist survey. This surveyed 527 tourists currently on holiday in the
Highlands, 280 in Fort William and 247 in Inverness, about their attitudes to
visiting Skye and the bridge tolls. From this survey we can draw the following
facts.
• Out of a sample of 527, 284 interviewees had considered visiting Skye.
The remaining 243 had never considered Skye as an option – we can
discount this latter group.
• 65 people considered Skye as a destination but rejected it. Of these 13
or 20% said this was because of the bridge tolls.
• 121 people intended to go to Skye. Of these 31 (26%) knew the cost
of the toll. We can assume these people were willing to pay the
charges.
• Of the 121, the remaining 90 people were unaware of the cost of the
toll. On hearing the cost: 71 (79%) responded on hearing the charges
that they would go anyway; however, 19 (21%) replied that now they
were aware of the toll they would no longer be visiting Skye.
• 83 people surveyed had already been to Skye on their current holiday.
Of these: 28 (34%) were aware of the toll charges before they went to
Skye.
63
• However, 55 (66%) had been unaware of the charge. Of these people
39 (71%) said they would have gone anyway and 16 (29%) said they
would not have made the trip to Skye had they known the charges.
4. From the above, we can conclude that out of a potential 284 tourists that
had thought about going to Skye:
• 13 considered the idea, but rejected it as the tolls were to expensive;
• 19 put off the idea upon hearing the toll charges;
• 16 went to Skye, but would not have had they been aware of the
charge.
5. The 13 who rejected the idea out of hand are simple to classify: these are
people for whom the toll charge is unacceptable. 
6. The 19 who did not go upon hearing the toll charges via the survey may or
may not have found out about the charges elsewhere before they set off for
Skye. Assuming that a further 26% of these people would have heard about
the charges (based on the proportion of those who already knew, above) we
can say that around 5 of the 19 would probably not have made the trip, while
3 of the remainder would turn back at the tolls (see below).
7. The 16 who turned up at the bridge and went to Skye, but said they would
not have gone had they known the charges, can be assumed not to go back
to Skye. Of course their places will be taken by new tourists, but over time
there will be a learning effect as more and more tourists hear about the toll
charges, so if a different sample was taken the following year some of these
16 would be aware of the tolls and may not go. Also the number of return
trips will be diminished. Assuming that awareness of the toll charges has
increased over the period 1996-2002, we could expect, in the long-term, 8 of
these 16 not to travel to Skye.
8. The System Three Survey did not survey cars at the bridge and did not
probe respondents about whether and why they made U-turns. However, the
DTZ Pieda (Scottish Executive, 1999) study did, and found that 9 cars out of
590 on a particular day in August 1998 made a U-turn because of the toll
costs. This equates at around 1.5% turning back. Applying this as
representative of the System Three sub-sample of 204 (121+83) who either
went or intended to go to Skye (i.e. those who would approach the bridge),
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we estimate that around 1.5% or 3 people in a sample this size would turn
back.
9. Summarising, we can estimate that out of a potential 284 visitors who
would consider visiting Skye:
• A total of 26 (13 + 5 + 8) would never have made the trip to Skye
because of the tolls;
• A further 3 would turn back at the barrier because of the toll costs
• Therefore 29 out of a potential 284, or 10% of visitors would be
deterred by toll charges.
10. From this we can assume that a 100% reduction in tolls, i.e. a fall to zero,
will result in a 10% increase in visitor numbers. Using this to calculate
elasticity we have:
PeD = 10% / 100% = 0.1
The estimate for price elasticity of demand is therefore 0.1. 
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Appendix 4: List of Consultees
We would like to thank all of the following for their contribution to this study.
Policy Actors
Dave Cotton Highland Council
Mike Greaves Highland Council
Ken Kennedy Comhairle nan Eilean Siar
John MacDonald Highland Council
Catriona MacLean Highland Council
Calum MacPherson Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise
Robert Muir Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise
David Noble Highlands of Scotland Tourist Board
Archie Prentice Highlands and Islands Enterprise
Bill Ross Highland Council
Information Providers
Peter Conlong Scottish Executive
Margaret Crawford Highlands of Scotland Tourist Board
Alastair Douglas Scottish Executive
Lynne Duff Scottish Executive
Derek Halden Derek Halden Consultants
Stuart Hay Scottish Executive
Mary MacPherson Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise
Jennifer MacRae Highlands of Scotland Tourist Board
Sharon Reid Visit Scotland
Peter Shannon The MacAulay Institute
Amelia Simonini SKAT
And our thanks also go to the 19 businesses in Skye and Lochalsh who
contributed their views and valuable information and to Professor Alison
McCleery of TRI, Napier University.
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